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Abstract 
Background and Objectives. Why do people donate blood? Altruism is the common 
answer. However, altruism is a complex construct and to answer this question requires a 
systematic analysis of the insights from the biology, economics and psychology of altruism.  I 
term this the Mechanism of Altruism (MOA) approach and apply it here to understanding 
blood donor motivation.. The answer also has enormous implications for the type of 
interventions we choose to adopt as a society. 
Methods. A review of the literature on altruism and blood donation. 
Results. A MOA approach so far shows that blood donors are a mixture of (1) warm-glow 
givers (donation is emotionally rewarding) and (2) reluctant altruists (cooperate rather than 
defect when free-riding is high). Donors also show ‘saintly sinning’ with the extra ‘moral 
currency’ form blood donation allowing them to be less generous in other contexts. The 
MOA suggests why financial incentives, in terms of gifts/lottery tickets, are effective and 
suggests a number of novel interventions for donor recruitment: ‘voluntary reciprocal 
altruism’ and ‘charitable incentivization’. It highlights the need for an intervention for both 
recipients to show their gratitude and society to celebrate blood donors and suggests a 
‘Monument to Blood Donors’ will achieve this. The approach suggests a number of novel 
research questions into (1) donor self-selection effects, (2) conditional cooperation and (3) 
construct overlap with Theory of Planned Behaviour (e.g., affective attitudes and warm-
glow). 
Conclusions.  The MOA offers a powerful way to understand blood donor motivations 
around altruism and develop theoretically driven interventions. 
Altruism and Blood Donation 
3 
 
Why do people donate blood? On the surface this question appears simple: donors are 
altruistic (Steinberg, 2010). However, this question is much more complex when one 
considers that, while, as a behaviour blood donation may be regarded as altruistic, the 
motivations underlying it may not be (Ferguson & Lawrence, 2015; Nuffield Council, 2011). 
Answering the motivational question – Why do people donate blood? – also carries 
implications for the type of interventions we choose to adopt (Nuffield Council, 2011). For 
example, if blood donation is motivated by pure altruism (i.e., helping another, at a personal 
cost, without personal gain), are we justified in using interventions that directly benefit the 
donor (financial incentives) or highlight benefits to the donor (i.e., highlighting personal 
emotional rewards)? In this paper I describe the mechanisms of altruism (MOA) approach 
which helps to answer, in a theoretically systematic way, the question: Why do people donate 
blood?, The MOA approach draws on insights from the biology, economics and psychology 
of altruism to identify the key mechanisms that can be used to describe the motivations of 
blood donors and ultimately inform interventions. Box 1 provides a brief summary of what 
the review and what the MOA approach adds to the existing literature. 
Blood Donation and Mechanisms of Altruism (MOA) 
 Can blood donation be described as an altruistic act?  The answer is broadly yes. The, 
act of blood donation conforms to all the main criteria for altruism, as defined in the social 
sciences (Ferguson & Lawrence, 2015). It is voluntary, benefits another in need and is costly 
to the donor (Steinberg, 2010). Furthermore, the vast majority of donors cite pure 
altruistic/humanitarian as their main motivation for donating (Bednall & Bove, 2011). 
However, while a behaviour, such as blood donation, may appear altruistic, it may actually be 
selfishly motivated (Milinski,  Semmann & Krambeck, 2002). Thus we need theoretical 
framework in which to understand blood donor motivations, and the MOA approach provides 
one such framework. 
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Across a wide variety of disciplines (e.g., psychology, economics, biology, sociology, 
and philosophy) a number of MOA have been proposed to explain the survival of altruism in 
the population, (Andreoni, 1990; Batson, 1991; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a-b; Nowak, 2006). 
However, this theoretically rich vein of research has rarely been brought to bear directly and 
systematically on the study of blood donor motivations (Ferguson et al., 2008). Below I 
briefly describe the different MOA that have been proposed and explore their implications for 
blood donor behaviour. 
MOA: Biological altruism, behavioural altruism and psychological altruism 
A useful framework to organize the literature on MOA distinguishes (1) biological 
(В-altruism), (2) behavioural (β-altruism) and (3) psychological (ψ-altruism) altruism 
(Clavien & Klein, 2010). 
Biological altruism refers to Darwinian fitness, where the long-term survival and 
fecundity of the recipient is achieved at a cost to the ‘altruist’ (Sober & Wilson, 1998). 
Indeed, products arising from blood donation, may bestow such long term survival for some 
recipients. β-altruism refers to people’s performance on economic games. These games 
examine how people allocate resources (usually money) between themselves and others. The 
pattern of allocations is used to infer MOA which are referred to as pro-social/other-
regarding preferences in the economics literature. Table 1 describes the basic games and the 
standard findings. Table 1 also acts as a reference to these methods for those interested in 
applying the MOA approach to the study of blood donor motivations. Finally, ψ-altruism 
examines people’s expressed motivations to act altruistically (Batson, 1991).  I will examine 
В-, β- and ψ-altruism separately and explore their implication for understanding altruistic 
blood donor behaviour. 
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Biological MOA and Blood donation 
From an evolutionary perspective a number of MOAs have been suggested to address 
the paradox of altruism: how does a costly behaviour, that benefits another, survive in the 
population (Nowak, 2006)? These MOAs and their relevance to understanding blood donor 
motivations are detailed in Table 2 and discussed below.   
 Reciprocity. The general concept of reciprocity can be used to group a set of these 
MOA: direct, indirect, and strong reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Nowak, 2006). 
Direct reciprocity requires directly repaying help received (Nowak, 2006). As blood donors 
and recipients are anonymous, and never meet, donors cannot be motivated by direct 
repayment. 
Indirect reciprocity comes in two forms: (1) downstream and (2) upstream (Nowak & 
Sigmund, 2005) (see Tables 2 & 3) .The role of downstream and upstream indirect 
reciprocity depends on whether the source of the reciprocation is the donor or the blood 
transfusion service (BTS) (Table 3)  
Downstream indirect reciprocity functions via reputation building (Nowak & 
Sigmund, 2005), with those who develop a good reputation more likely to be helped by 
others (Milinski et al., 2002). Indeed, blood donation is viewed by others as an act that 
signals the donors good reputation as an altruistic person (Lyle, Smith & Sullivan, 2009). 
More specifically, the act of blood donation has been characterized as a costly signal for 
altruism (Lyle et al., 2009). Costly signals indicate costs (e.g., energy, time, pain) or 
attributes (e.g., altruism) that are not fakable, as the organism sustains the cost of the signal 
without detriment. Importantly, this signals an organisms value as a mate relative to others 
who cannot sustain such a cost (Zahavi, 1977). Thus, if reputation building is a key MOA for 
the donor (Table 3: Cell A) signalling to others you are a blood donor would be a powerful 
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signal (Zollman, Bergstrom, & Huttegger, 2013). However, evidence shows that donors 
rarely talk to others about their donor status (Ferguson & Chandler, 1995). However, this 
study was small scale and described how often donor’s talk about their donor behaviour. 
Costly signalling theory (CST) suggests we need ask not how often people display a costly 
signal but who is most likely to signal and when. Applied to blood donors, CST suggests that 
donors should be more likely to communicate about being a donor when they are childless 
and in their reproductive years. Thus, it remains to be seen if reputation building is part of the 
motivation framework of blood donors. There is also another way in which downstream 
indirect reciprocity may work to foster donor recruitment. That is, when a friend/relative of a 
person who has benefited from a blood donation becomes a donor to repay their gratitude to 
the transfusion service (Cell B, Table 3).  
Upstream indirect reciprocity occurs when the person receiving help goes on to help a 
different individual (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005) (Table 2). It is argued that gratitude arising 
from being helped motivates helping others (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005)
1
. Upstream indirect 
reciprocity is unlikely to function as a mechanism for recruiting blood donors, as a recipient 
of blood is unlikely to be able to go on and donate blood (Cell C, Table 3). However, the 
recipient may feel gratitude to the transfusion service and persuade others to donate (Cell D). 
Strong reciprocity is ‘… a willingness to sacrifice resources for rewarding fair and 
punishing unfair behavior even if this is costly and provides neither present nor future 
material rewards for the reciprocator’ (Fehr, Fischbacher & Gatcher, 2002: p 2: their italics).  
Thus helping is conditional on the perceived positive reputation of the recipient, but crucially 
not on a future reward from the recipient. Strong reciprocation could motivate blood donors 
as they (1) do not expect a future reward, and (2) are likely to perceive both the recipient of 
                                                          
1
 Helping does not always result in gratitude in the recipient. A sense of indebtedness may also ensue, 
in what is referred to as the ‘tyranny of the gift’ (Mauss, 1990) and people may actively avoid being 
helped or retaliate against their helper (Ma, Tunney & Ferguson, 2014) 
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blood and the transfusion service as deserving. This would also imply, however, that the 
blood donors would be more likely to punish unfair behavior, than non-donors. 
Kin Selection. Kin selection is predicated on the proposal that the degree of helping is 
proportional to the degree of genetic relatedness, with individuals preferentially helping kin 
over non-kin (Nowak, 2006).
 
Although reported by blood donors as a motivation (Kuruvatti, 
Prasad, Williams, Harrison, & Jones, 2011), kinship cannot sustain donation since blood 
cannot be donated directly to relatives.  
Behavioural (β) Altruism 
A number of MOA have been identified in terms of peoples’ patterns of responses on 
economic games (see Table 1). These are discussed below in relation to blood donation. 
Pure Altruism. The degree of pure altruism (a direct concern for the welfare of the 
recipient) may be inferred from responses to the dictator game (DG). In a DG (Table 1) the 
rational response, is to donate nothing, in an anonymous context with no negative 
consequences for not giving. This maximizes the dictator’s payoff. Any positive amount 
donated indicates degrees of altruism.
2
. 
Warm-Glow. In terms of a pure altruism, the person should only be interested in the 
recipient (individual or organization) receiving sufficient allocations to meet their needs. 
However, people continue to give, even when external agencies provide sufficient resources 
to the recipient. This causes the individual donor’s donations to make no difference to the 
recipient (Andreoni, 1990). To explain this, Andreoni (1990) suggests that people gain extra 
utility from the act of giving itself – the ‘warm glow’ of giving. Combining warm-glow and 
pure altruism results in impure altruism: the individual donates to attain warm-glow and 
                                                          
2
 However, others has questioned that allocation in a standard dictator game reflect solely 
altruistic preferences (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). 
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benefit others simultaneously.
 
Fong (2007) characterizes warm-glow as an unconditional 
motivation for helping, as it is unrelated to the characteristics of the recipient. As blood 
donors never know the recipient, the unconditionality of warm glow makes this a probable 
key motivation for blood donors.  
It can be argued that Andreoni’s (1990) conceptualization of warm-glow suggests it 
can be both (1) experienced at the time of giving as well as (2) anticipated (Ferguson & 
Flynn, 2015). Indeed, the “Donor Identity Survey’, based on self-determination theory, 
identifies a factor called ‘intrinsic regulation’ that reflects, to an extent, aspects of anticipated 
warm-glown (e.g., item: “I enjoy donating blood”) (France, Kawalsky, France, Himawan, 
Kessler & Shaz, 2014). 
Warm-glow, both experienced and anticipated, has implications for blood donor 
recruitment and retention. If we consider blood donor motivations as a phenotype, then 
theoretical models of environment-phenotype matching (i.e., people seek out environments 
that match their phenotype) suggest that donors will seek out environments that match their 
motivations (Dickens & Flynn, 2001). There is some evidence to support this in general 
(Davis, Mitchell, Hall,  Lothert, Snapp & Meyer, 1999). People who have a stronger 
preference for anticipated warm-glow, for example, should prefer contexts where they can 
experience more warm-glow. Donating blood may be classified as a behaviour affording a 
high potential for warm-glow, as it is both worthy as well as high cost. Therefore, making a 
successful donation should be emotionally very rewarding. A potential donor, motivated 
primarily by warm-glow, may seek out contexts that provides maximum warm-glow and 
therefore, be attracted to blood donation.  
Anticipated and experienced warm-glow are linked, and this linkage may alter the 
motivation itself (Ferguson, Heckman & Corr, 2012). That is, if the anticipation and 
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experience of high levels of warm-glow are matched or exceeded, positive reinforcement is 
likely to occur and the donor may become addicted to donation: ‘a warm-glow junkie’ 
(Piliavin & Callero, 1991). This would result in donors with a strong preference for warm-
glow self-selection to remain as donors. It may even be that over time these donors come to 
require “extra” warm-glow (see Charitable Incentives section below). However, when the 
level of experienced warm-glow does not match the anticipation of high warm-glow, 
retention may be low.  
Conditional Cooperation.  Conditional cooperation is observed when a person is 
aware of the average contributions of others in a public goods game (see Table 1) and 
matches that contribution in a linear fashion, but gives slightly less (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004b). A stylised graph of a typical conditional cooperation function is given in Figure 1. 
The fact that conditional cooperators do not match others’ contribution exactly shows some 
degree of self-interest. In experimental studies approximately 50% of the samples are 
classified as conditional cooperators (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b). Are samples of blood 
donors similarly made up of 50% conditional cooperators, or are donor samples more or less 
likely to contain conditional co-operators?  If blood donor samples consist of at least 50% 
conditional cooperators the manner in which information on normative donor behaviour is 
presented is crucial. For example, focusing on the number of donors rather than the donation 
rate will be problematic and potentially lead to a reduction in donor recruitment and 
retention. Telling donors, who are conditional cooperators, that the number of active donors 
is low, informs them that they do not need to donate. However, telling conditional 
cooperating donors about the average rate of donation (i.e. ‘Donors in your donor centre 
donate 3 times a year on average’) may motivate them to adopt this rate. Thus, we need to 
explore what percentage of blood donors are conditional cooperators.   
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Equality and Fairness Norms. Norms of equality suggest that people are averse to 
inequality between themselves and others and thus motivated to reduce any inequality (Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999). Inequality is advantageous if you are better off than others. This results in 
feelings of guilt, and reducing the inequality is one way to reduce the adverse feelings of 
guilt. The healthy donor is by definition better off than potential recipients. Thus, this leads to 
the suggestion that maybe blood donors could be motivated by guilt. Consistent with this, the 
‘Donor Identity Survey’ identifies a factor called ‘introjected regulation’ that reflects this idea 
of guilt driven advantageous inequality aversion as a motivation for blood donors (e.g., item: 
“I would feel guilty or ashamed of myself if I did not donate blood”) (France, Kawalsky, 
France, Himawan, Kessler & Shaz, 2014). 
Norms fairness (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) can be further identified via 3
rd
 party 
punishment games (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a), dictator game (DG) allocations and 
rejection rates in ultimatum games (Ferguson, Maltby, Bibby & Lawrence, 2014). In the 3
rd
 
party punishment game, the 3
rd
 party, is not involved in the actual exchange between players. 
However, the 3
rd
 party can choose to pay, at a personal cost, to punish players who transgress. 
As 3
rd
 party punishers would maximize their payoff by not punishing, this behaviour is 
believed to reflect enforcing norms of fairness (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a & b). Similarly in 
the ultimatum game, the recipient is always better off if they accept any offer. However, as 
offers become increasingly unfair, recipients reject at higher rates and both the proposer and 
recipient receive nothing. One possibility is that the recipient is signalling disapproval to the 
proposer, to encourage them to act more fairly in future interactions (Ferguson et al., 2014). 
Thus we could ask if blood donors have stronger norms of fairness and inequality aversion. 
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Psychological (ψ) Altruism 
Psychological research focuses primarily on identifying the motivations people 
express for their altruistic acts. 
Pure Altruism and Negative State Relief. Similar to economics, a pure altruistic 
motivation reflects an ultimate desire to reduce others’ suffering, at a personal cost, without 
any personal benefit (Batson, 1991).
 
An alternative proposal suggests that people help 
primarily to relieve their own negative mood, arising from observing or imagining another in 
need, rather than reduce others’ suffering (Cialdini,  Schalle, Houlihan, Arps,  Fultz & 
Beaman, 1987).  
Reluctant altruism. Studies of conditional cooperation (Figure 1) show that free 
riding occurs at a high rate (approximately 30%). For blood donation this is much higher at 
about 96% (Abasolo & Tsuchiya, 2014). Thus, research has focused on identifying 
mechanisms to reduce free-riding and increase cooperation. Dominant among these is 2
nd
 
party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a: see Table 1). That is, when people have the 
provision to identify and punish free-riders, cooperation rates rise. Anger is believed to 
motivate punishment and fear of punishment to motivate reductions in free-riding, even if 
punishment is merely threatened (Skatova & Ferguson, 2013). The standard account, 
therefore, is that anger directs punishment at free-riders to promote cooperation. However, 
Ferguson, Atsma, de Kort and Veldhuizen, (2012b) identified a pattern of motivation in blood 
donors that is the opposite of this standard account. They termed this reluctant altruism.  
Reluctant altruism represents a preference for helping rather than punishing, when 
faced with free-riding. This is founded on two mechanisms that run directly opposite to the 
standard accounts. First, reduced trust in others’ willingness to cooperate is linked to 
increased cooperation. The standard account indicates that increased trust is linked to 
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increased cooperation (Balliet & van Lange, 2012). Second, the negative emotions directed 
towards free-riding, as well as resulting from a lack of trust in others (Dunn & Scheitzer, 
2005), are instead directed towards energizing helping rather than punishment. This indicates 
that the reluctant altruists should (1) persist in helping as long as free-riding is high and (2) 
want to reduce levels of free-riding by ‘inspiring’ others to help. As levels of free-riding are 
constantly high for blood donation, reluctant altruist should persist as blood donors and be 
more likely to evangelise about blood donation to try inspire and recruit others donors.  
The third pattern of responses observed in the conditional cooperation experiments is 
referred to as the ‘humped’ distribution (Figure 1) and has received little discussion (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004b). However, this may be a behavioural signature of reluctant altruists. The 
‘humped’ responder shows a proportional increase in cooperation when others cooperate, on 
average, below 50%. Once average levels of cooperation in others increases above 50%, 
‘humped’ responders reduce their cooperation in a proportionally inverse fashion. Thus 
‘humped’ responders help when free-riding is high, but reduce helping once cooperation 
becomes the norm. As reluctant altruists are hypothesised to help preferentially when others 
are not trusted to help and help less when others’ helping is established, the humped shape 
conforms behaviourally to the definition of a reluctant altruists. Ideally, for a reluctant altruist 
signature, the level of cooperation given by reluctant altruists should be above the line of 
proportionality when others’ cooperation is low.  
MOA and Donor’s Self-Reported Motivations 
Above a number of motivation for altruistic acts have been identified that may be 
relevant to blood donation. However, are these represented in the way in which donor 
motivations have been assessed? 
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In terms of psychometric scales, the self-reported altruism (SRA) scale (Rushton, 
Chrijohn & Fekken, 1981) has been used predominantly to examine general trait altruism in 
blood donor (Otto & Boole, 2011; Steele, Schreiber, Guiltinan, Nass, Glynn, Wright, Kessler, 
Schlumpf, Tu, Smoyh & Garratty, 2008; Schlumpf, Glynn, Schreiber, Wright, Steele,  Tu, 
Hermansen Higgins, Garratty, & Murphy, 2008). However, the evidence shows that the SRA 
does not predict actual blood donation (Schlumpf et al., 2008). There are a number of reasons 
why the SRA may not predict in the context of blood donation. First, The SRA assesses a 
general trait towards low cost helping (example item: “Given directions to a stranger”), while 
blood donation is a high cost behaviour. Second the SRA does not assess specific MOA that 
are pertinent to blood donation. To address these issues, Evans and Ferguson (2014) 
developed an index of blood donor motivations based on the MOA pertinent to blood 
donation (appendix A). Furthermore, in terms of traits it may be the case, for repeat prosocial 
acts like blood donation), that conscientiousness which represents being organized and 
methodical, rather than altruism, is more important and predictive (Ferguson, 2004, 2013).  
Rather than examining responses to pre-defined questionnaire items, like the SRA, we 
can ask people to freely describe what motivations them to donate blood. Bednall and Bove 
(2011) reviewing this literature showed that prosocial motivations (altruism, collectivism) 
dominate. Donors also express motivations based on indirect reciprocity and warm-glow 
(they termed these intrinsic motivations). Their coding frame, as well as the coding frames of 
others, have not been set within a MOA approach. So to examine the extent to which 
expressed motivations match with MOA, I examined data from a survey of 309 blood donors 
across both fixed (N = 215: 137 females, 75 males, 3 missing; mean age = 23, range = 18-57) 
and mobile sites (n = 94: 49 females, 43 males; mean age of 34.1, range 18 - 66) which was 
part of a larger study (Ferguson, Singh & Cunningham-Snell., 1997). Donors were asked: "In 
the space below please list as many reasons you have for deciding to give blood today".  Free 
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responses were content analysed for manifest categories by two raters (blind to the research 
hypotheses) who took half of the questionnaires each and analysed them for common themes. 
The resultant coding frame was applied to all the questionnaires.   
34 reasons for donation were identified (inter-rater agreement = 93%) and a sub-group 
were categorized into six MOA: ‘altruism’, ‘indirect reciprocity’, ‘warm-glow’, ‘self-
interest’, ‘reluctant altruism’ and ‘advantageous inequality aversion’ (See Table 4). The other 
reasons were categorized either as miscellaneous motivations, interventions or the blood 
donation context. People could freely respond by mentioning more than one reason. An 
overall summed score was calculated for each of the 6 MOA. For example, ‘altruism’ has 3 
associated reasons for donating. So any individual could score between 0 (not altruistic) to 3 
(strongly altruistic). In total, across the 309 participants, the 6 MOA were mentioned 426 
times. Figure 2 indicates the percentage (out of 426) that each MOA is mentioned.  
‘Altruism’, ‘indirect reciprocity’ and ‘reluctant altruism’ are mentioned with the highest 
frequency. Thus MOA are present in donors reported motivations, but do any of these predict 
actual donation. 
Combining β- and ψ-Altruism: Saintly Sinners and Warm-Glow Givers 
Both ψ-altruism (self-reported motives) and β-altruism (behaviour indicators of pro-
social preferences) have their strengths and weaknesses: (1) self-reported motivations can be 
biased in terms of presenting a socially desirable image (Bednall & Bove, 2011) and (2) pro-
social preferences may represent a number of alternative underlying motivations (Camerer & 
Thaler, 1995). Therefore, to identify the MOA underlying blood donation converging 
evidence across ψ- and β-altruism is needed. To what extent has this been shown? 
Saintly Sinners and Warm Glow Givers A number of the theoretically derived 
motivations for blood donation (pure altruism, warm-glow, strong reciprocity, conditional 
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cooperation, fairness enforcement) can be identified behaviourally and cross validated 
psychometrically. In the only series of studies to apply β-altruism methods to blood donation, 
Ferguson et al. (2012a) compared blood donors and non-blood donors on variants of the 
dictator game (Table 1) – the charity dictator game (CDG). This was used to assess altruism 
and warm-glow giving. The CDG is proposed as a more ecologically valid index of altruism 
(Eckel & Grossman, 1996). The structure of the basic CDG is shown in Figure 3. Participants 
have to decide how much (“some, none or all”) of an endowment (£2 in 20p pieces) to donate 
to a charity of their choice. In a second study participants were presented with an ID card 
from a charity collector, who was collecting on behalf of a specific charity and decide how 
much of £2 in 20p pieces to donate to that charity. A final variant of the CDG, developed by 
Crumpler and Grossman (2008), was used to assess warm-glow (WG-CDG). The WG-CDG 
game is shown in Figure 3. Participants choose to donate some, none or all of their 
endowment - £2 in 20p pieces – to a charity of their choice. However, in this variant the 
donation results in no financial benefit to the charity. The participant is informed that the 
charity already has been given £2, by the experimenter, and that any money the participant 
donates to their chosen charity the experimenter will take the equivalent amount from the £2 
the experimenter has allocated to that charity. If the participant donates 40p, the experimenter 
removes 40p from their £2 allocation to that charity. The charity will always have £2 
regardless of what the participant donates. As the participant’s donation is of no financial 
benefit to the charity, the only motivation for donation is ‘warm-glow’. In all three 
experiments the donation decisions are real, as participant are aware that they keep what they 
choose not to donate and the charity is sent whatever they choose to donate or sent £2 
regardless of what they donated in the WG-CDG..  
The pattern of results across these three experiments was very informative (Figure 4). 
In the two variants of the standard CDG, while both groups were generous, blood donors 
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gave significantly less than non-donors. This reflects what may be referred to ‘saintly 
sinning’ (Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009). A person who defines themselves as good – the 
blood donor – feels that they may have some ‘moral licence’ to behave less pro-socially due 
to an accumulation of moral currency. A complete reversal, however, is observed in the WG-
CDG. Again while both groups are generous, blood donors are now more generous than non-
donors. The simple change in the focus of the CDG alters how blood donors choose to 
donate, suggesting that blood donors are driven to help by warm-glow. These behavioural 
data resonate with psychometric field data, where expressed preferences for personal benefit 
and warm-glow predicts both behavioural intentions to donate in experienced blood donors 
(Ferguson et al., 2012b) and actual attendance to donate (Ferguson et al., 2008).  
Strong Reciprocity Ferguson et al. (2012a) also showed that, consistent with strong 
reciprocity theory, participants were more likely to reward fair behavior and punish free-
riding. However, this pattern was observed equally for blood donors and non-donors. Thus 
blood donors are no more likely to be strong reciprocators than non-donors.  
Psychometrics: Reluctant Altruism 
Ferguson et al (2012b) showed that reluctant altruism emerged as a factor predicting 
intentions to donate for first time and novice donors (up to 3 previous donations) but not 
experienced donors. However, the reluctant altruist should persist as a donor, as the free-
riding in blood donation remains high. Warm-glow should kick in as a motivator as the donor 
becomes more experienced, with the warm-glow donor self-selecting to remain as a donor.  
The index of donor motivations developed by Evans and Ferguson (2014) identified a 
reluctant altruism factor that correlated with warm-glow and donation intentions in donors 
and non-donors.  
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Implications for Research and Interventions 
If blood donors are classified as saintly sinning, warm-glow giving, reluctant altruists 
what are the implications of this and the other MOA for research and interventions?  Table 5 
lists each of the MOA and the novel research questions and intervention implications of each. 
Research 
A number of new research questions and hypotheses are suggested by the MOA 
approach. These are summarized in Table 5. Key among these are self-selection effects. Self-
selection suggests that those donors with a higher preferences for warm-glow should be both 
attracted to blood donation and more likely to remain as donors. Reluctant altruists should be 
attracted to be new donors and remain as donors especially if their warm-glow preference is 
high.  
What percentage of blood donor are conditional cooperators? This unanswered 
question has clear implications for interventions that focus on the normative information. It is 
hypothesises that if blood donors are conditional cooperators, then interventions that focus on 
the number of donors would be ineffective and those that focus on the donation rates should 
be effective.  
Interventions 
Three driving criteria need to be considered when discuss the efficacy of intervention 
design. First, they are theory based (Abraham & Michie, 2008; Ferguson, France, Abraham, 
Ditto & Sheeran, 2007). Second, there needs to be congruency between the intervention focus 
and the prevailing motivations of the recipient (e.g., Clary et al., 1998). Third, the Nuffield 
Council (2011) suggests that the interventions we choose have implications for the sort of 
society we wish to live in. Interventions that do not reflect societal values may not be 
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accepted. With these criteria in mind, I will look at interventions that focus either directly 
(e.g., warm-glow) or indirectly (e.g. financial/charitable incentives) on MOA.  
Warm-Glow 
Below I describe the implication of warm-glow preference for intervention design. 
Pure Altruism vs Warm-Glow Interventions. As empirical evidence shows that 
blood donors are warm-glow givers, then it maybe ethically justified to highlight personal 
benefits of blood donation (Nuffield Cuncil, 2011). Furthermore, this implies that 
interventions that focus on pure altruism (‘save a life’) may not be as effective as warm glow 
interventions. Ferguson et al. (2008) compared a warm-glow message (e.g., “By donating 
blood you may feel pleased, fulfilled, contented, and proud of yourself”) with a pure altruism 
message (e.g., “By donating blood you are helping to treat patients recovering from diseases 
such as leukaemia, cancer, sickle cell disease, and thalassemia”), and showed that the warm-
glow message increased willingness to donate blood in committed donors.  
However, a recent meta-analysis suggests that altruism focused interventions can be 
effective (Godin, Vezina-Im, Bedlanger-Gravel & Amireault, 2010). However, examining 3 
of the 4 altruism interventions, in the meta-analysis, suggests that they may not be assessing 
pure altruism. The study reported by Paulhus, Shaffer and Downing (1977) focused on the 
donor’s good will to support their community, which may represent societal duty rather than 
altruism. Social duty is more akin to moral norms which predict donor intentions (Bednall, 
Bove, Cheetham & Murray, 2013). Similarly, Ferrari and Leippe (1992) emphasised moral 
norms and civil duty. Reich, Roberts, Laabs, Chinn, McEvoy, Hirschler and Murphy (2006) 
manipulated empathy rather than altruism, and the mechanism here may be warm glow 
arising from empathy (Ferguson, 2015). Thus, it is unclear that these studies actually 
manipulated pure altruism and none contrasted it directly with warm-glow.  
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Charitable Incentivization. The possible benefits of charity-based financial 
incentives for blood donation have been proposed (Sass, 2013). Here the donor receives cash 
for donating blood that they can donate to another charity. This intervention may work by 
providing the opportunity to gain extra warm-glow. If blood donation is not charitable 
enough, to generate the full amount of warm-glow the donor wants, than extra ‘warm-glow’ 
potentially comes from the opportunity to help a second health based philanthropic cause 
(Martin, 2013). This may have real appeal for the warm-glow motivated blood donor. In 
terms of the societal values can we justify such incentives? As blood donors are likely warm-
glow givers rather than pure altruists, and this type of intervention leads to additional societal 
benefits, I feel such interventions are justifiable. Indeed, the Nuffield Council (2011) 
observes that “… In circumstances where altruism does not play a central role, there appears 
to be much less justification for avoiding the use of financial reward as a form of recognition 
(p 14)”. Furthermore, as MAO approach so far suggests that, in fact, blood donation is not 
motivated primarily be pure altruism then a wider range of incentives, including financial 
ones is justifiable.  
The Reluctant Altruist  
 What are the implications of reluctant altruism in the donor pool for intervention 
design? These are detailed below. 
Financial Incentives, Gifts and Lotteries: Titmuss (1971) famously stated that 
financial incentives would lead to a reduction in both donor numbers and the quality of blood, 
by crowding out intrinsic motivation. However, the effectiveness of financial incentives to 
enhance blood donor recruitment, while not reducing blood safety, has received strong 
empirical support (Lacetera, Macis & Slonim, 2013). For example, in a large-scale field 
based experiment, of approximately 100,000 donors, Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2014) 
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showed that donor attendance was proportional to the level of incentive (a gift card for 
various shops) offered. Similarly, Goette and Stutzer (2008) showed that lottery tickets 
increased donation rates. However, it must be noted that these financial incentives are in the 
form of lottery tickets and gifts vouchers and not direct payment. Lacetera, Macis and Slonim 
(2013) have pointed out that framing incentives as ‘gifts’ rather than ‘payment’ may be 
crucial to the effectiveness of incentives with Steinberg (2010) suggesting that the incentive 
should be ‘trivial’ relative to the discomfort of the act of donation. 
These incentivized effects for ‘gifts’ may, in part, reflect the idea that the blood donor 
pool contains reluctant altruists. If free-riding remains high, even when a ‘gift’ is offered, the 
reluctant altruists should be more motivated to help. That is, if people still cannot be trusted 
to help, even when they get something in return, the reluctant altruist should be more 
determined to help and inspire others to donate (see Table 5).  
If reluctant altruists are more motivated to help when incentives do not lead to a 
reduction in free-riding, what about warm-glow? If warm-glow is considered an intrinsic 
motivation, incentives should act to undermine it, leading to a reduced donation rate. 
However, warm-glow, in the context of blood donation, is linked to helping the community 
(Evans & Ferguson, 2014), so also has an other-regarding aspect to it and is not a pure 
‘selfish’ motivation. Furthermore, the strength of the warm-glow in the blood donor context 
this likely to be a very strong and this strength reduces the likelihood of it being crowed out 
by a small gift voucher (Table 5). 
Voluntary Reciprocal Altruism (VRA). VRA draws on norms of fairness and 
reciprocity, whereby self-interest is seen as leading to a fair and just outcome (Landry, 2006). 
Landry (2006) showed that VRA lead to increased intentions to be an organ donor.  
Altruism and Blood Donation 
21 
 
VRA, as conceived by Landry (2006), is activated by a two question strategy. The 
first question is designed to highlight and align the concept of reciprocity and self-interest 
with fairness: “I would want a blood transfusion to save my life: YES or NO”. If the 
responder answers YES, this highlights (1) a personal potential future need, and (2) to meet 
this need we all need to contribute (general solidarity, reciprocity and fairness). The second 
question asks the respondent’s willingness to donate blood: “I would be willing to donate 
blood: YES or NO”.  If they are willing to take blood, by answering ‘Yes’ to question 1, it is 
only fair to give blood back and thus answer YES.  Considering answering NO to this 
question highlights a potential harm. That is, if others also answer NO, but are still willing to 
accept blood, this could result in a shortage. Highlighting a potential shortage may activate 
reluctant altruism. That is, the potential donor questions the trustworthiness of others to act 
fairly and donate blood. This leads to a simple set of empirical questions: (1) Does this 
simple two-question strategy results in increase donations? and (2) Is VRA more effective for 
reluctant altruists?  
Inequality aversion 
Models of inequality aversion indicate that emphasising guilt arising from not 
donating (“guilt primes”) may be an effective intervention (Table 5). However, Figure 2 
suggests that guilt is mentioned relatively rarely by donors. Given the relative rarity of this 
motivation, highlighting guilt linked to not donating may put potential donors off (O’Carroll, 
Shepherd, Hayes & Ferguson, 2015). Further France et al (2014) report that guilt is not 
predictive of blood past donations when other motivations are considered simultaneously.  
This type of intervention also raises concerns about whether highlighting anticipated negative 
mood, as a means to recruit donors, is the sort of intervention we want as a society.  
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Celebrating the Donor and the Recipient: A Monument to Blood Donors  
As a society we may want to afford recipients of blood the opportunity to say ‘Thank 
you’ to donors. Recipients of blood may wish to express their gratitude. However, as they are 
most likely unable to donate blood they have no direct means to repay blood (Table 3 Cells C 
& D). The idea of reciprocating a gift, is central to many MOA, and theories of the gift-
exchange (Mauss, 1990). Thus, an intervention is needed that gives the recipients a potential 
voice, as well as celebrating the contribution of blood donors. An approach pioneered in the 
field of whole body donation, to have a monument to those who have donated their bodies, 
could be adopted (Bolt, 2012). Monuments to celebrate blood donation would not only 
establish a mechanism for recipients to express their gratitude, but also may inspire future 
donors and acknowledge as a societal valuable contribution of blood donors. Recipients could 
make financial donations towards the creation of monuments, thus offering a tangible means 
of reciprocating. Recipients could leave tokens of thanks and inspiration (flowers, narratives 
about how the transfusion helped etc.). These could be cited in all major towns.  
Parsimony in Theory: Implications for Theory of Planned Behaviour 
 One final implication of adopting a MOA approach is parsimony of theoretical 
constructs applied to blood donation. Two questions are pertinent: (1) How do the constructs 
in other models theoretically relate to MOA? and (2) What extra predictive value do MOA 
add?  
It is suggested in the review that a new measures of donor motivation the ‘Donor 
Identity Survey” (France et al., 2014), may tap constructs such as advantageous inequality 
aversion and warm-glow. While this is a new and important index the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB) is the main motivation theory applied to blood donation (Bednall et al., 
2013; Ferguson, 1996). TPB suggests that behaviour is predicted proximally by intentions, 
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with intentions predicted in turn by (1) attitudes, (2) subjective norms (i.e., people who are 
important to the donor approve) and (3) perceived behavioural control (PBC: i.e., Feeling 
able to adopt the behaviour despite possible barriers). PBC also has a direct effect on 
behaviour. Attitudes are further split in to affective (i.e., anticipated positive or negative 
emotional responses towards blood donation) and cognitive (i.e., the pros and cons of 
donation) (Conner, Godin, Sheeran & Germain, 2013). 
In the prosocial domain two of these constructs, affective attitudes and subjective 
norms, overlap with warm-glow and reputation building respectively. Affective attitudes 
reflect anticipated feelings, both positive and negative, associated with the act of giving 
(Conner, et al., 2013) with the positive feelings reflecting warm-glow. There is evidence that 
positive affective attitudes predict blood donation (see Lemmens, Abraham, Ruiter, 
Veldhuizen, Dehing, Bos & Schaalma, 2008). Donating blood because others think it is a 
valued activity (subjective norm) may ultimately be concerned with reputation regulation – 
what others think of you matters.  
Indices of ‘altruism’ have also been added to TPB.  For example Lemmens et al. 
(2008) included an altruism index and showed that it did not add incrementally to the 
prediction of donor behaviour. This may be because the index was domain non-specific 
(example item: “Helping those in need, is a good deed”), whereas the TPB items were blood 
donation domain specific.  
Conclusions 
This review has highlighted that understanding blood donor behaviour, using the 
concept of altruism, is more complex than first appears. Adopting a MOA approach suggests 
that blood donors can be described as “saintly sinning, warm-glow giving, reluctant altruists”, 
and not simply as pure altruists. The MOA approach requires moving away from over 
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reliance on self-report to cross-validating models with behavioural methods designed to 
assess MOA. The MOA suggests why, in part, certain interventions – such as financial 
incentives with gifts– that traditional theory has dismissed as likely ineffective, are 
potentially effective. The MOA suggests a number of novel interventions for donor 
recruitment and retention (warm-glow messages, voluntary reciprocal altruism, charitable 
incentives, guilt primes) that could be effective. It also highlights a societal level intervention 
to allow both recipients of blood to express their gratitude and publically celebrate the 
contribution, to society, of blood donors (‘Monuments to donation’). It also highlights a 
series of novel research questions. Are blood donors a self-selected group, self-selecting on 
reluctant altruism, and in the long term on warm-glow? It highlights the dangers of using 
normative information in terms of donor number as an intervention and highlights the 
benefits of using donation rates. These and other implications of the MOA approach are 
summarised in Table 5. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Stylized Conditional Coopetition Function (MUS = Monetary Units). Adapted from 
Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) 
Figure 2. Expressed MOA for Donation 
Legend to figure 2: These percentages represent the frequency with which each MOA is 
expressed out of the total of 426 times they were expressed. 
Figure 3. Charity Dictator Game (A) and Warm-Glow Charity Dictator Game (B) 
Figure 4. Results from the Charity Dictator Games as Described in Ferguson et al (2012b). 
MUS = Monetary Unit and the maximum that could be offered was 10 in all game. Error bars 
= standard errors. 
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Appendix A: Mechanism of Altruism Index_Blood (MOAI_Blood) 
Please read the following statements and indicate how much you agree or disagree with them by 
circling the number that best describes your opinion.  
I would donate blood because …        
 Strongly 
agree 
     Strongly 
disagree 
1. I would be doing something to help others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I would want to let members of the opposite sex 
know I am a good, kind person 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I can take time off work or lectures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I would want to show people that I am a good, kind 
person 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I cannot trust others to donate blood 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. you get a free cup of tea and biscuits when you have 
donated blood 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I  would feel good about myself after donating blood 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I would want to let my friends know that I am a 
good, kind person 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. other people can’t donate blood, so I would have to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I believe we are responsible for helping others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. if I gave blood there is more of a chance of friends 
receiving it if they need it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I think the world would be a better place if everyone 
who could, gave blood 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. you get a free blood test/ find out what blood type 
you are when you donate blood 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. You receive stickers, badges and pins when you have 
donated blood 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. if I gave blood there is more of a chance of family 
receiving it if they need it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. donating blood is the right thing to do 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. I would feel proud by helping people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. by donating blood I could save someone’s life 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. by donating blood I can give back to the community 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I believe donating blood is a personally rewarding 
experience 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. donating blood would make me feel physically good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. if I gave blood I would be fulfilling my duty to society 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. so few other people donate blood someone has to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. if I gave blood there is more of a chance of close 
relatives receiving it if they need it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Scoring: Impure Altruism = 1, 7, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18: Self-Regarding = 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 13, 14: Kinship = 11, 
15, 24: Reluctant Altruism = 5, 9, 23: Egalitarian Warm-Glow = 19, 20, 21, 22 
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Box 1. What the Mechanisms of Altruism (MOA) approach adds  
Altruism in the transfusion literature: The current state of play 
1. Altruism is generally treated as a generic construct. 
2. Altruism is viewed as the main motivation for blood donation and as the basis for 
interventions and policy discussions. 
3. Motivations are assessed by self-report.  
Altruism in the transfusion literature: What MOA approach has added so far 
1. The application of the MOA approach so far has: 
 shown blood donors motivations reflect specific MOAs, with donors described as warm-
glow givers (motivated to donate primarily because it makes them feel good), 
 lead to the discovery of a new MOA: ‘reluctant altruism’. Reluctant altruists are those 
who donate because they cannot trust to do so and try to encourage others to donate  
 shown reluctant altruism to be a strong motivation for early career donors, 
 suggested that  blood donors are saintly sinners. 
Altruism in the transfusion literature: The MOA approach and future suggestions 
1.  The MOA suggests a number of new research themes and interventions  
Research  
 Selection-effects may be operating. Reluctant altruist should be attracted to blood 
donation because blood donation is characterised by high free-riding. Warm-glow givers 
should be attracted to blood donation, as this context maximizes experienced warm-
glow.  
 Based on costly signalling theory blood donors should communicate about their donor 
status maximally in their fertile years and when childless. This effect should be stronger 
for reluctant altruists who should be more prone to evangelise about blood donation. 
 Conditional cooperation is a primary MOA in humans, yet we do not know what 
percentage of blood donors are conditional cooperators. This has important implications 
for norm based interventions. If blood donor samples have a large number of conditional 
cooperators, norm based interventions focusing on ‘donor rate’ may be effective, but 
interventions based on the ‘number of donors’ may not be. 
Interventions  
 Interventions should be based, directly or indirectly, on MAOs and not generic 
‘altruism’. 
 A ‘one-size fits all’ intervention strategy will not be effective, as MOA vary across the 
donor career (reluctant altruism in the early stages and warm-glow later on). 
 Interventions based on charitable incentives or voluntary reciprocal altruism, should be 
effective. 
 Suggests, in part, why financial incentives (gifts/lottery tickets) have been shown to be 
effective. 
 Highlights the need to consider interventions aimed at recipients as well as donor. It is 
suggested that building ‘monuments to blood donors’ will allow recipients to express 
their gratitude, inspire new donors and as a society allow us to celebrate the contribution 
of blood donors. 
 The MOA approach suggests why certain norm focused interventions may not be 
effective. 
 
 
Altruism and Blood Donation 
36 
 
Table 1. Basic Economic Games to Assess Preferences for Cooperation, Altruism, Fairness and Norm Violations 
 Games for Preferences for Cooperation, Altruism, Fairness  
Games Description Indexes 
Dictator 
Game 
There are two players – a dictator and a recipient. The dictator has a financial endowment and can choose to 
transfer some, none or all to the recipient, who has nothing. The payoff for each is whatever the dictator 
decides. While the rational choice is to give nothing. The mean is to offer 20-30%.  
Altruism 
Trust Game There are two players – an investor and a trustee. The investor has a financial endowment and can choose to 
invest some, none or all with the trustee, where the amount invested is multiplied (usually by a factor of 3 or 
4). The trustee then decides how much (some, none or all) of this multiplied sum to return to the investor. 
Investors behaviour 
index trust and the 
trustees reciprocity 
Standard 
Public Goods 
Game (PGG) 
Played in groups of four anonymous players. Each has an equivalent endowment (private account) and can 
contribute some, none, or all to a group (public) account. Whatever is contributed is summed, doubled and 
paid back equally to all members regardless of their initial contribution. Each person’s payoff equals what 
they keep in their private accounts plus what is returned from the public account. The maximum payoff for 
the group is when everyone contributes maximally and equally. However, not contributing (free-riding) will 
maximize the individuals’ payoff, as long as other group members contribute something. When played over 
a number of rounds cooperation levels start high and tend towards free-riding. 
Amount given to the 
public account indexes 
cooperation 
Prisoners 
Dilemma 
There are two players (A and B) who simultaneously decide to cooperate (C) to benefit (b) the other at 
some cost (c) (be altruistic) or defect (D) by acting selfishly. If both choose D then neither gains the 
maximum payoff. If A chooses C and B chooses D then B gains as they have paid no cost and gain while A 
has paid a cost. If both choose C then both gain as long as b > c.  
Cooperation and 
Defection 
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Table 1 cont/d. Basic Economic Games to Assess Preferences for Cooperation, Altruism, Fairness and Norm Violations 
 Games for Preferences Punishments of Norm Violations  
Games Description Games 
   
Public Goods 
Game – With 
Punishments 
As the Standard PGG. However, there is an option to punish free riders (2
nd
 party punishment) at a cost. 
Usually participant pays 1 monetary unit to punish the free-rider by 3 units. This is open to 2
nd
 order free 
riding (non-punishers free-riding on others punishment). Punishment options lead to increased cooperation, 
but reduced efficiency (less overall resources for the group). 
Punishing to enforce 
norms of cooperation. 
Potentially motivated 
by anger. 
Third Party 
Punishment 
A player who is not part of a Dictator Game, Trust Game or PGG (a third party) observes players and can 
punish. For example, in a Dictator Game they can choose to pay to punish the dictator (usually again at a 
1:3 ratio) based on the dictators allocations 
Punishing to enforce 
norms of fairness. 
Potentially motivated 
by anger or moral 
motivation 
Ultimatum 
Game 
Two players: a proposer and recipient. The proposer has an endowment and the recipient knows the value of 
that endowment. The recipient has nothing. The recipient chooses to accept or reject any offer the proposer 
makes. If the recipient rejects the offer both parties get nothing, if they accept both parties get the offer as  
proposed. Recipients are more likely to reject offers as they become increasing unfair (moving from a 50:50 
share to a 90:10 - where the first figure reflects the proposers share and the second the recipients). The 
recipient should accept all offers as even 10% of any endowment is a better payoff than they started with 
(which is zero). Unlike the Dictator Game the power now resides with the recipient. 
Spite, Norm of Fairness 
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Table 2. Mechanism for Altruism (Solid arrows indicate helping preferentially given and dashed arrows when help is less likely to be given) 
Mechanism Definition Blood Donation 
Direct 
Reciprocity 
  (A) directly helps (B) who returns the favour by helping (A) at some 
future date. 
This mechanism cannot underlie blood 
donation as donor and recipient never 
meet or interact. 
Down 
Stream 
Indirect 
Reciprocity 
                      (A) directly helps (B). In so doing (A) gains a positive reputation 
(either via the help given to (B) being observed or via gossip). Given 
the positive reputation (A) is more likely to be helped by others (C). 
Unlikely mechanism for blood donation 
as donors rarely publicize they are 
donors, but may work if the transfusion 
service is the source of help (See Table 3 
for more detail). 
Up Stream 
Indirect 
Reciprocity 
                                                 (A) directly helps (B). (B) goes on to help (C). It is suggested that (B) 
helps (C) due to positive affect – specifically gratitude – that (B) feel 
as a result of help received by (A). 
This is an unlikely mechanism for blood 
donations as B (recipient of a transfusion) 
is unlikely to be able to donate (See 
Table 3 for more detail). 
Strong 
Reciprocity 
 Regardless of future reciprocation the strong reciprocator (A) will 
preferentially offer help to those with a good reputation (B+) and 
punish those with a poor reputation (C-) 
Are blood donors more likely to respond 
positively to other’s good reputation and 
punish transgressor? The answer is no.  
Kin                                            (A) shows preferential helping to relatives (B) than non-relatives (C) Unlikely to underlie blood donation as 
donors cannot give blood preferentially to 
their relatives. 
Reluctant 
Altruism 
 Reluctant altruism is a positive response to free-riding. The reluctant 
altruist (A) will offer help preferentially in the context where little help 
is given by others (in this case helping C who receives little help from 
B) compared to a context where help is frequently offered (it is case 
where E is helped a lot by D). This is especially the case if C is a ‘good 
cause’ or has a good reputation. 
Blood donation is characterized by free-
riding and is a good cause. As such, 
blood donors should be more likely to be 
reluctant altruists. This is the case for 
first time donors. 
 
B A 
A B 
C 
 
 
 
A B+ 
C- 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B C 
D E 
A B 
C 
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Table 3. The Potential Roles of Up Stream and Down Stream Indirect Reciprocity as a Function of  the Donor or Transfusion Service as the 
Target 
 Down Stream Indirect Reciprocity Up Stream Indirect Reciprocity  
The Donor 
 
 
 
 Based on present data this is 
an unlikely mechanism for 
motivating blood donation 
as donors rarely publicize 
they are donors. As such, 
are unlikely to gain the 
positive reputation that 
attracts preferential help 
from others.  
 
 Unlikely mechanism for 
motivating blood donation. The 
recipient (B) feels grateful to the 
donor (A) and helps others in 
some way as they cannot repay A 
directly. B is unlikely to help 
others (C) by becoming a blood 
donor, as those how have been 
transfused may not be eligible to 
donate. This will not have any 
benefit (reputation or preferential 
helping) for the donor (A). B may 
encourage others (C) to donate. 
The Blood 
Transfusion 
Service 
(BTS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Potential mechanism for 
blood donation. The 
recipient of a transfusion 
(B) from the BTS (A), is 
known to a potential donor 
(C) (relative or friend) and 
therefore C reciprocates 
with the transfusion service 
by donating. 
 
 
 
 The recipient (B) feels grateful to 
the BTS (A) but as with Cell C is 
unlikely to be eligible to donate 
blood to help others (C)  
 
 
 
C 
 
Donor Recipient (stranger) 
Other 
A 
C 
 
BTS Recipient  
 
 
B
Donor  
(Relative/ 
Friend of B) 
Other 
 
A C 
 BTS Recipient 
B 
Other 
Cell A Cell C 
Cell B Cell D 
A B A C 
 Donor Recipient 
B 
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Table 4. MOA and Self-Reported Reasons to Donate Blood 
MOA Motivation Reasons for Donating 
Altruism/Communal ‘Help others/worthwhile’ (45.6%), ‘Duty’ (11.7%)  ‘Save a life’ (13.3%) 
Indirect Reciprocity  ‘In case self, friends, or relations need it’ (16.8%) 
 ‘Friends, Relations, I have needed blood in the past (4.2%) 
Warm-Glow ‘Feel Good about myself’ (7.6%), ‘I enjoyed it, make me feel good’ 
(7.6%) 
Self-Interest ‘Free health check’ (5/5%), , Tea and Biscuits, Stickers’ (5.2%), Miss 
lecture/work, get drunk quicker’ (3.2%), ‘Overcome anxiety/challenge’ 
(2.3%), ‘Reach Target’ (1.0%), ‘Reduce nose bleeds (0.3%) 
Advantageous 
Inequality Aversion 
‘Guilty, ease conscience’ (2.6%) 
Reluctant Altruism ‘Important, Necessary, Useful and Needed’ (16.2%) ‘Set an example to 
others’ (1.6%), ‘Blood in short supply’ (10.4%), 
Miscellaneous  ‘I wanted to’ (3.6%), ‘Never done it before and wanted to find out about 
it’ (1.3%), ‘So don’t have to import suspect blood’ (0.3%), ‘Not given for 
a while’ (1.3%), ‘No reason why I should not, it’s easy’ (4.9%) 
Interventions  
Direct from 
Transfusion service 
‘Advertised’ (3.2%), ‘Sent a letter’ (5.8%), ‘Special appeal’ (0.3%), 
‘Extra invitation, useful blood group’ (4.2%) 
Social ‘Friend and relation who are blood donors persuaded me’ (10%) 
Context  
Personal ‘Lucky to be healthy’ (3.6%), ‘Convenient’ (5.2%), ‘Free time’ (6.1%). 
‘Regular donor’ (5.5%), ‘Have a dull existence’ (0.3%) 
Organizational ‘To support the BTS’ (5.2%). ‘Research’ (0.3%) 
Note. Percentages are the percentage of those who reported each motivation. As people could 
report more than one motivation percentage add to greater than 100% 
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Table 5.  New Research Predictions and Intervention Suggestions Derived from the MAO Approach  
MOA Research Predictions and Questions Interventions Suggestions and  Questions 
Warm-Glow  Selection Effect: There should be a selection effect towards 
those with greater anticipated warm-glow (1) being attracted to 
donate blood compared to other charitable acts and (2) those 
with greater anticipated and congruent experienced warm-glow 
remaining as blood donors. That is, the proportion of warm-
glow givers should increase in experienced donors. These may 
be described as ’warm-glow’ junkies and may require warm-
glow boosts. 
 Affordance: Compared to other charitable acts, blood donation 
should be rated as more likely to generate warm-glow. 
 Parsimony of theory: Affective attitudes for prosocial acts, 
from the Theory of Planned Behaviour, should be equivalent to 
warm-glow. 
 Crowding out: Warm-glow associated with blood donation 
should not be crowded out by financial incentives. 
 For following ‘warm-glow’ slogans have been 
used in campaigns in the past: ‘Feel good, Give 
blood’, ‘Look good, Give blood, Feel Great’.  
However, these have not been systematically 
evaluated. As warm-glow is likely a strong 
motivation for blood donors, trials evaluating 
these slogans are needed. 
 Charitable incentives to attract donors should be 
more effective for those with high levels of 
anticipated warm-glow, as the opportunity to 
donate to another health charity, contingent on 
donating blood, should generate an extra ‘warm-
glow’ boost. This needs testing in a simple RCT 
(charitable incentive vs personal financial 
incentive vs personal gift voucher vs health 
check vs donation as usual) with experienced 
warm-glow assessed as the mechanism. Some 
work along these lines has been started by 
Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008). 
Indirect 
Reciprocity 
 Those who know someone who has had a successful 
transfusion should be more likely to donate. 
 For following badge has been issued in the past: 
‘Be nice to me, I gave blood today’. However, 
its impact has not been systematically evaluated. 
A key question here is “Who would choose to 
display such badges?”  Costly Signalling Theory 
suggested that childless donors in their 
reproductive years should be more likely to 
display such badges. Also reluctant altruists 
should be more likely to display such badges. 
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 Monuments to Blood Donors to allow recipients 
an opportunity to say thank you, inspire new 
donors and celebrate the contribution of blood 
donor to society. These could be cited as a 
National monument as well as by region. As a 
simple public service intervention, these should 
be implemented very quickly. 
Costly 
Signals 
Theory 
(CST) 
 A basic prediction form CST is that the prevalence of 
communicating about being a donor (talking about blood 
donation, wearing a badge saying ‘Be nice to me, I gave blood 
today’) should be greatest during the fertile years and for those 
who are childless. 
 
 
Reluctant 
Altruism 
 There should be a higher prevalence of reluctant altruists in 
first time and novice donors.  
 Reluctant altruists who also have a higher preference for warm-
glow giving should remain as blood donors. 
 Reluctant altruists should be motivated to donate more when 
free-riding persists in the face of incentives such as financial 
gifts.  
 Reluctant altruists should be more likely to evangelise about 
blood donation and recruit new donors. 
 Highlighting that blood is needed and that 
consistently very few people donate blood 
should motivate the reluctant altruist to donate 
and to set an example to others.  
 Voluntary Reciprocal Altruism (VRA) should 
increase donations by enhancing a sense of 
reluctant altruism. A simple RCT (comparing 
VRA to standard recruitment or a control arm) is 
needed to test the predicted effectiveness of this 
intervention and also if the effect of VRA is 
stronger for reluctant altruists. 
 Reluctant altruists should be motivated to donate 
more when free-riding persists in the face of 
incentives. 
Conditional 
Cooperation 
 What percentage of blood donor populations are ‘conditional 
cooperators’? This can be tested by exploring the conditional 
cooperation function in samples of blood donors and  non-
donors. 
 Conditional cooperators will judge the number of donations to 
make relative to their reference group.  
 Highlighting how often other donors in a donor’s 
reference group donate per year will increase the 
number of donations. A simple RCT (comparing 
the message ‘On average donors at you centre 
donate 2 time a year’ vs a control) is needed to 
test this prediction. 
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Inequality 
Aversion 
   Highlighting the relative resources the healthy 
donor has, compared to the unhealthy recipient, 
should generate feelings of guilt. (For example, 
“As a healthy person, you can give blood, and 
help those less healthy than you”). Feelings of 
guilt will drive the desire to donate. This could 
be tested using a simple RCT comparing the 
about message to a non-message or standard 
message control. 
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Fig 1 
 
Fig 2 
 
Altruism and Blood Donation 
45 
 
Fig 3 
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